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I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Winship' the United States Supreme Court explicitly held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects each
person accused of a crime against conviction "except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged."3 The Court noted the importance of this reasonable doubt
rule, saying-
The reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role in the American
scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk
of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete
substance for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock "axiomatic and
elementary" principle whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law."
4
Because the reasonable doubt rule specifies the allocation of the
burden of persuasion5 on the issues to which it applies, it limits the inherent
sovereign power6 of state legislatures to regulate criminal procedure in
their own courts. The task has fallen to the United States Supreme Court,
as a matter of constitutional interpretation, to alleviate the tension
between the reasonable doubt rule and traditional concepts of state
autonomy by establishing the analytical framework for determining the
issues of fact to which the reasonable doubt rule applies.7 The case of
Patterson v. New York 8 is the Court's most recent statement of the analysis
to be used in future cases.
This Case Comment will first discuss the analytical framework used
by the Court in Patterson to determine the applicability of the reasonable
1. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
3. 397 U.S. at 364.
4. Id. at 363.
5. The burden of persuasion, also known as the risk of non-persuasion, is one component of
what is commonly referred to as the burden of proof. The burden of persuasion comes into play only
upon submission of the case to the factfinder at the close of all of the evidence. It specifies the degree of
certainty the factfinder must have in order to find in favor of theburdened party. Under theburden of
persuasion imposed by the reasonable doubt rule the factfinder is instructed to find in favor of the
accused unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the state's assertions. See
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 336, 341 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
McCoRMICK'S].
6. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). See text accompanying note 83 Infra.
7. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684(1975); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
8. 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (White, J., writing for the Court, joined by Burger, CJ., and Stewart,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Brennan and Marshall,
JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J. took no part in the decision).
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doubt rule to particular issues. An examination will follow of the effects
of the Patterson decision upon courts, legislatures, and those accused of
crimes. The rationale used by the Court to justify its approach will be
presented and criticized in light of prior cases and countervailing policy
considerations. Finally, the outlines of a possible alternative to the
Patterson approach will be considered.
II. THE Patterson DECISION: FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 27, 1970, after borrowing a rifle from an acquaintance,
Gordon Patterson went to the residence of his father-in-law. Through a
window he saw his estranged wife in a state of semi-undress in the presence
of John Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had once been engaged and
who she had resumed dating. Patterson entered the house and shot
Northrup twice in the head, killing him.
Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. Under New
York law a person is guilty of this offense when "with intent to cause the
death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third
person."9 New York statutorily recognizes as an affirmative defense to
this crime that the accused acted "under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was reasonable justification or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be."10 This defense must be proved by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence." The defendant who successfully proves
this defense is nevertheless subject to a conviction for manslaughter if it is
shown that he intentionally killed another person "under circumstances
which do not constitute murder because he acted under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance.' 2
The jury at Patterson's trial was instructed that the state bore the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
intentionally killed a human being and that the defendant bore the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting the
defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Patterson failed in his attempt
to prove the defense and was found guilty of murder. His conviction was
affirmed by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division1 and again
by the Court of Appeals of New York.14
In Patterson v. New York the United States Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether the New York practice of allocating to the defendant the
9. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1975).
10. Id. § 125.25(1)(a).
11. Id. § 25.00(2).
12. Id. § 125.20(2).
13. People v. Pattersbn, 4 App. Div. 2d 1028, 344 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1973).
14. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (197Q .
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burden of persuasion on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance violated the reasonable doubt rule embodied in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court defined the scope
of the reasonable doubt rule by holding that "the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is
charged."' 5 The rule, however, does not extend to "every fact . . . which
[the state] is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating
circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the
punishment."'16 Since the New York legislature chose to include as
elements in the statutory definition of murder only the death of a human
being, causation of that death by the defendant, and an intent on the part
of the defendant to kill some person, these were the only facts that the state
was required to prove. 17 Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the state
was not required to prove the absence of extreme emotional disturbance.
Otherwise stated, the reasonable doubt rule, after Patterson,.applies only
to those facts the state legislature has deemed important enough to include
in the definition of the offense.
The Patterson Court distinguished but did not overrule 8 its earlier
holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur,'9 in which it had invalidated on due process
grounds a Maine judicial practice that placed on a person accused of
murder the burden of persuasion on the defense of heat of passion upon
sudden provocation, a defense very similar to the New York defense of
extreme emotional disturbance. By leaving the narrow holding of
Mullaney intact, the Patterson Court provided a reference point useful in
understanding the import of the Patterson analysis. Since Maine's "heat
of passion" defense is subject to the reasonable doubt rule while New
York's "extreme emotional disturbance" defense is not, comparison of the
two defenses will facilitate an assessment of Patterson's impact and logic.
III. THE Patterson APPROACH AND ITS PRACTICAL EFFECTS
A. Comparison of the Maine and New York Defenses
The Maine defense of heat of passion and the New York defense of
extreme emotional disturbance share a common ancestry. They are not
distinguishable on the basis of the functions they serve, nor do they involve
proof of significantly different states of mind. The two defenses differ
15. 432 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 207.
17. Id. at 205-06.
18. 432 U.S. at 212-16. For the manner in which the Patterson opinion distinguished the
Mullaney opinion, see text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
19. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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significantly only in the textual devices by which the burden of persuasion
on each is allocated.
Both defenses trace their roots to the common-law offense of
felonious homicide, which was subdivided into murder and manslaugh-
ter. Murder was punishable by death but manslaughter carried a lesser
penalty.20 The distinguishing factor between murder and manslaughter
was the existence of malice aforethought. 21  An unlawful killing
committed with malice aforethought was murder; an unlawful killing
without malice aforethought was manslaughter.
"Malice aforethought" is a term of art having little to do with the
generally understood meaning of "malice" or of"forethought." A modern
author has defined it as "an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated
man-endangering-state-of-mind. 22 Positive and negative elements must
both be proved before malice aforethought is established. The positive
element is the presence of a "man-endangering-state-of-mind." The
negative element is the absence of justification, excuse or mitigation. At
common law, once the fact of a killing was established, malice was
presumed. The burdens of production and persuasion were on the
accused on the issues of justification, excuse, or mitigation.
"Heat of passion" refers to a particular state of mind, the existence of
which was recognized as a circumstance of mitigation. It can generally be
described as a temporary mental disturbance, suddenly arising24 due to.25 ,
reasonable provocation 5 that "render[s] one's mind for time being deaf
to reason. 26 A person acting in the heat of passion cannot be acting with
malice aforethought since proof of heat of passion disproves the requisite
negative element and reduces the crime of murder to manslaughter.
Maine, at the time of Mullaney's conviction,2 7 retained the common-
law scheme in its law of homicide. Murder was statutorily defined as an
unlawful killing of a human being "with malice aforethought, either
express or implied. 28 Manslaughter included, by statutory definition, an
unlawful killing "in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation, without
express or implied malice aforethought., 29 The offenses of murder and
20. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISii LAW 484-88 (2d ed. 1898). See
also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 67 (1972).
21. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *198. See also W. LAFA'E & A. ScoTT, supra note 20,
§ 67.
22. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 568-69 (1934).
23. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *201. See also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 20,
168.
24. People v. Ashland, 20 Cal. App. 168, 128 P. 798, 802 (1912).
25. People v. Wells, 10 Cal. 2d 610, 76 P.-d 493 (1938).
26. Balthazor v. State, 207 Wis. 172, 240 N.W. 776 (1932).
27. The Maine law of homicide has been substantially revised, effective May 1,1977. 17-A ME,
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-06 (West Supp. 1977).
28. 17 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2651 (1964).
29. Id. § 2551.
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manslaughter had been judicially interpreted to be degrees of the single
crime of felonious homicide rather than separate crimes.30 Once the
prosecution had proved the elements of felonious homicide, i.e.,
intentional, unjustifiable, and inexcusable homicide, a "policy presump-
tion" arose, and the defendant would be convicted of murder, the more
serious offense, unless he could prove the existence of heat of passion. 1
This presumption of malice did not relate to the guilt or innocence of the
accused, but served to allocate the burden of persuasion on the "reductive
factor" of heat of passion. 32 Proof by the accused by a preponderance of
the evidence that the felonious homicide occurred in the heat of passion
upon sudden provocation would rebut the presumption of malice and
reduce the degree of the homicide to manslaughter.33
The New York scheme under which Patterson was convicted
distinguishes* murder from manslaughter somewhat differently.34 New
York statutorily defines as second-degree murder the actions of the accused
when "with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person. 35  The statutory text includes an
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance,36 which, if proved
by the defendant, reduces a charge of murder to manslaughter.37
The Maine and New York defenses differ in their use of the terms
"heat of passion" and "extreme emotional disturbance" respectively. A
look at the legislative history of the New York defense dispels any notion
that the New York legislature, by adopting the phrase "extreme emotional
disturbance" intended to diverge significantly from the substance of the
common-law concept. New York, in an earlier version of its manslaugh-
ter statute had used the term "heat of passion" in a context foreign to the
common-law crime of manslaughter. 38 The staff of the State Commission
on Revision of the Penal and Criminal Code, in redrafting the existing
New York offense, sought to replace it with "the traditional crime
embracing the principle of mitigation."39 In the process the Commission
abandoned the term "heat of passion" in favor of the "extreme emotional
disturbance" language found in the Model Penal Code 0 because it
30. State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 144 (Me. 1971).
31. Id. at 146; State v. Neal, 37 Me. 468, 470 (1854).
32. State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 146 (Me. 1971).
33. Under Maine practice, as a matter of judicial custom, the jury was instructed on
manslaughter as well as murder and given the option to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense.
State v. Park, 159 Me. 328, 193 A.2d 1 (1963).
34. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
35. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
36. Id. § 125.25(2).
37. Id. § 125.20(2).
38. Id. §§ 1050, 1052 (McKinney 1944).
39. N.Y. STATE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF TIE PENAL AND CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED
NEW YORK PENAL LAW, Commission Staff Notes § 130.20 (1964) [hereinafter cited as PROPOsED
PENAL LAW].
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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considered the new language superior "both in terms of logic and general
fairness."
4 1
The Model Penal Code concept of extreme emotional disturbance
is substantively very similar to the common-law concept of heat of passion.
Both terms refer to particular mitigating states of mind. The concept of
extreme emotional disturbance, however, is applicable in a somewhat
greater range~of cases because certain restrictions that had been imposed
on-the common-law concept were discarded by the drafters of the Model
Penal Code.42 The common-law defense was generally available only
when the actor's turbulent state of mind had been provoked by an injury,
injustice, or affront perpetrated by the deceased.43 The Model Penal Code
concept is not so limited in terms of the source of the provocation,44
Second, the common law contained rules regarding the sufficiency of
particular forms of provocation; for example, the rule that words alone
were never enough.45 The Model Penal Code discards these hard and fast
rules and adopts instead an approach looking to all of the circumstances of
the case.46 Finally, the common-law concept was based upon an objective
standard of the reasonableness of the provocation.47  The test was
generally whether a reasonable person would have acted as the defendant
did. The Model Penal Code prescribes a more subjective standard that
takes into account differences in individual temperament.
48
Thus, the Model Penal Code concept of extreme emotional
disturbance, and the New York defense that embodies it, are very similar to
the common-law concept of heat of passion adopted by Maine. As noted
by Justice Powell in his dissent in Patterson, "extreme emotional
disturbance is simply a 'new formulation' for the traditional language of
heat of passion. '49 Inclusion of these similar defenses in the laws of Maine
and of New York indicates that both states have decided to decrease the
punishment imposed upon the defendant who kills while in a state of
emotional turbulence. The function of both the Maine and New York
defenses is to separate out those defendants whose conductjustifies greater
punishment from those whose conduct justifies only a lesser punishment.
The Maine and New York defenses, identical in function and very
similar in content, differ, however, in the textual devices used to allocate
41. PROPOSED PENAL LAW, supra note 41.
42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
43. E.g., State v. Seaton, 106 Mo. 198, 17 S.W. 169 (1891).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
45. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 212, at *200. See also W. LAFAvE &A. ScOTT,supra note 20,
§ 69.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
47. E.g., People v. Danielly, 33 Cal. 2d 362, 202 P.2d 18 (1949).
48. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
49. 432 U.S. at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting).,
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the burden of persuasion on each defense to the defendant. Maine used a
presumption of malice and required the defendant to rebut that
presumption by proving that he acted in the heat of passion. The words
"malice aforethought" appeared in the statutory definition of murder.
New York, on the other hand, allocated the burden of persuasion on the
defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the defendant through the
device of an affirmative defense. No term inconsistent with extreme
emotional disturbance appeared in the text of the statutory definition of
murder. It was this difference in the text of the statute that the Patterson
Court found significant.50 Maine's constitutional error consisted in
"shifting the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the state
deem[ed] so important that it must be either proved or presumed."5 1
B. Criticism of the Patterson Approach: Practical Effects
The Patterson opinion determines the applicability of the reasonable
doubt rule on the basis of a very formalistic analysis.5 2 Under the
Patterson rationale the reasonable doubt rule applies only to "ingredients"
of an offense.53 Ingredients of crimes are whatever the state legislatures
decide to include in the statutory definition. The Court's approach
"requires only that the most basic procedural safeguards be observed:
more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused has
been left to the legislative branch.5 4
State legislatures can comply with the basic procedural safeguards
outlined in Patterson without alleviating onerous burden of persuasion
allocations on particular issues. Assume, for purposes of demonstration,
that two hypothetical states revise their criminal codes after Patterson.
State A defines murder as an intentional killing in the absence of extreme
emotional disturbance and assumes the burden of persuasion on the issue
of extreme emotional disturbance. State B defines murder as an
intentional killing and includes an affirmative defense that the defendant
acted while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The
burden of persuasion on the affirmative defense is on the defendant in state
B. Both states have demonstrated a willingness to mitigate the severity of
punishment in cases of extreme emotional disturbance but only state A has
committed itself to bear the risk of error in factfinding on this issue. State
B has avoided this commitment through its choice of language. Patter-
son allows it to do so.
The Patterson rationale drains the reasonable doubt rule of any
50. Id. at 214.
51. Id. at 215.
52. Justice Powell in his dissent to Patterson found the majority's rationale "indefensibly
formalistic." Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 215.
54. Id. at 210.
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power it had to specify which of the substantive issues of fact arising in a
criminal case should be proved by the state as part of its burden. At
present, the rule does not regulate the issues the defendant can be required
to prove; it only regulates the textual devices by which the burden of
persuasion may be allocated by the states.
The formalism of the analysis gives rise to fears that state legislatures
will abuse their power by eliminating some of the traditionally recognized
ingredients of crimes and requiring the defendant to negate those
ingredients by means of affirmative defenses. As safeguards against this
danger, the Court pointed only to the past record of legislative restraint
and to a few limitations developed in prior cases dealing with the
constitutionality of legislative presumptions." Given that state legisla-
tures are free to define crimes as they will, these protections against being
declared "presumptively guilty of a crime" and against "presumption of all
facts necessary to guilt" are reduced to mere platitudes. The Patterson
opinion leaves a void in which the exercise of state autonomy in the area of
criminal procedure is virtually unrestrained by constitutional limita-
tions.56
To the person who trusts the state legislatures to shoulder the task of
balancing the interest of the accused against the interests of society this
void will pose no problem. The person who believes -that the Constitution
requires judicial supervision over this power of the state, however, will
have some cause for alarm. Whether or not the legislatures can be trusted
with this task is open to question. Legislators may perceive an economic
benefit in reducing the number of issues the prosecution must investigate,
present, and prove. Legislators are also exposed to the pressures of public
opinion-the recurring outcries for reduction of crime -that are
frequently characterized by a lack of concern for the rights of those
accused of perpetrating crimes. These institutional considerations
indicate that the courts should have the opportunity to review the balance
struck in the legislature. Nevertheless, the Patterson Court, convinced by
arguments for state autonomy, chose to leave the balancing solely in the
hands of the legislatures. The adequacy of these arguments is examined in
the next section.
55. Id. at 211 n.12.
56. Several cases interpreting the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment suggest limits to the legislatures' ability to eliminate "ingredients" of crimes. The
Supreme Court has indicated that there cannot be criminal liability when the accused has not been
shown to have committed an act. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Thus, states cannot
redefine crimes to allow conviction merely upon proof that the accused holds a particular status,
Another case indicates that the punishment provided by a statute cannot be grossly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense defined. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Professor Ronald
Allen argues that the Patterson Court's reasoning implicitly adopts the eigath amendment requirement
of proportionality as a limit upon the power of the state legislature to elminate traditional elements
from the statutory definitions of crimes. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on
Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 Micmi. L. REv. 30, 51-53
(1977). This interpretation is not supported by the text of the opinion. As Professor Allen admitted,
id. at 53. neither the eighth amendment nor the concept of proportionality is mentioned in Patterson,
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IV. THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
Patterson ANALYSIS
The Patterson majority used both precedent and policy to justify its
decision to favor the concept of state autonomy over the reasonable doubt
rule. Each of the justifications offered is vulnerable to criticism.
A. The Argument From Precedent
To reconcile its holding with prior decisions the Court in Patterson
had to deal with two lines of cases. One line develops the reasonable
doubt rule and indicates that the rule might limit the substantive issues on
which the states could allocate the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
The second line establishes and clarifies the recognized prerogative of the
state legislatures, in drafting their criminal laws, to allocate to the
defendant the burden of persuasion on certain issues. The Patterson
decision purports to be consistent with both of these lines of cases.
An early application of the reasonable doubt rule is found in Davis v.
United States, 7 a federal prosecution for murder 8 in which the defendant
attempted to establish the defense of insanity. The trial court had
instructed the jury that there was a presumption of sanity and that in order
to prevail on his defense, the accused would have to carry the burden of
persuasion on the issue of insanity. The Supreme Court held that
[n]o man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the
jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences to say that the evidence
before them, by whomsoever adduced, is sufficient to show beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged.59
The Court found that the crime of murder necessarily involves the
possession by the accused of- such mental capacity as will render him
criminally responsible for his acts.60 Insanity, however, would negate the
existence of the required mental capacity.6' Thus, the Court said, if the
evidence did not exclude beyond a reasonable doubt the hypothesis of
insanity, the guilt of the accused could not be said to have been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
62
The Davis holding was not based on the Court's reading of any
57. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
58. The case fell within the federal criminaljurisdicti6n because the killing took place in Indian
territory. Id. at 474.
59. Id. at 493.
60. Id. at 485.
61. Insanity constitutes an excusing circumstance under the law of Maine. If insanity is present,
an unjustifiable, inexcusable, and unmitigated man-endangering-state-of-mind does not exist. See
text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
62. 160 U.S. at 488.
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constitutional provision.63  Not until In re Winship64 was the reasonable
doubt rule explicitly held to be among the essentials of due process and fair
treatment required by the fourteenth amendment.
Winship discussed the important interests served by the reasonable
doubt rule. The Court noted:
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction ...
Moreover, use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of
the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
people are being condemned.65
Winship discussed the mechanism by which the reasonable doubt rule
served these interests. The Court quoted an earlier first amendment case
in which it had said:
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in
factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party
has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his
liberty-the margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on
the other party the burden . . . of persuading the factfinder at the
conclusion of his trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
66
Thus, the purpose of the reasonable doubt rule, as elucidated in Winship, is
to protect the interests of the accused by reducing the risk of an erroneous
conviction. The rule is indispensable because it "impresses on the trier of





The Winship opinion did not elaborate on the applicability of the
reasonable doubt rule to specific factual issues. 68 The Court said simply
that the rule was applicable to "every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which the accused is charged. 69
Mullaney v. Wilbu7 presented the question whether the reasonable
doubt rule applied to the specific issue presented by the heat of passion
63. The nonconstitutional basis of Davis was pointed out by the CDurt in Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 797 (1952).
64. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), discussed at text accompanying notes 1-4 supra. Winship
specifically held that a state must prove juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt.
65. Id. at 363-64.
66. Id. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)).
67. 397 U.S. at 364.
68. Such elaboration was unnecessary in Winship because the state had, by statute, lowered the
prosecution's burden of persuasion on all of the issues in the case to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence rather than allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant on a particular issue.
69. 397 U.S. at 364.
70. 421.U.S. 684 (1975).
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defense.7' In deciding the question the Court developed an analytical
framework that had important and potentially wide-ranging effects. In
holding that the reasonable doubt rule applied to the heat of passion
defense the Mullaney Court indicated that it was taking a broad view of the
scope of the rule. The Court accepted the statement of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court that the defense did not relate to the guilt or
innocence of the accused, but only to the degree of the offense.72 The
Supreme Court refused, however, to limit the scope of the rule to "those
facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the defendant.""3 The
rule applied, the Court indicated, to issues that determine the degree of the
defendant's culpability as well as those that determine his guilt or
innocence.
The analysis employed by the Court in Mullaney looked "to the
operation and effect of the law is applied and enforced by the
state . . . and to the interests of both the state and the defendant as
affected by the allocation of the burden of proof.' '74 The Court found that
both the defendant's interests and the state's interests were substantially
affected by Maine's practice on the heat of passion defense. The
defendant was subjected to the risk of significantly greater punishment 5
and substantially increased stigma upon conviction. The state risked
potential erosion of public confidence in the reliability of jury verdicts.
Because the operation of the heat of passion defense affected these
important interests, the Court found it necessary to hold the defense
subject to the restrictions of the reasonable doubt rule.76
The implication of the Winship and Mullaney cases is that the
reasonable doubt rule might be applicable to a very broad range of issues."
The Mullaney analysis contemplates an active role for the courts in
reviewing the operative effects of the substantive issues arising in criminal
cases. The weighing of society's interests against those of the accused is
not left solely to the legislatures.
In reconciling its holding in Patterson with Winship and Mullaney the
Court distinguished Mullaney in a way that severely limited Mullaney's
implications. Patterson specifically denied that Mullaney had held that:
71. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
72. 421 U.S. at 691.
73. Id. at 697-98.
74. Id. at 699.
75. Manslaughter was punishable by a fine'of not more than SlOO or by imprisonment for not
more than 20 years. 17 ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 2551 (1964). Murder, on the other hand, was
punishable by life imprisonment. Id. § 2651 (1964).
76. 421 U.S. at 700-01.
77. See Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the
Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. Rav. 390 (1976); Note, Affirmative Defenses After
Mullaney v. Wilbur. New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 BisooLYN L. REv. 171 (1976);
Note, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHio ST. LJ. 828(1975).
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the state may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or the severity of
punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the presence or
absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden of proving the
presence or absence of that fact, as the case might be, beyond a reasonable
doubt.
7
Instead, the Patterson opinion interpreted Mullaney to hold only that "a
state must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming
that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense."
9
The Patterson treatment of Mullaney is somewhat disingenuous, as
Justice Powell, the author of Mullaney, noted in his dissent in Patterson.0
Patterson focuses solely on the elements the legislature has included in the
definition of the crime, but Mullaney had specifically rejected any such
formalistic interpretation of the scope of the reasonable doubt rule,
stating: "Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of
formalism."' Indeed, the Court's opinion in Mullaney proceeded on the
assumption that malice, the fact presumed, was not an element of the
crime. 2 Nowhere in Patterson is there any discussion of the factors, so
critical in Mullaney, of the increased punishment and stigma Patterson
would face if he could not prove extreme emotional disturbance. Little of
the Mullanev rationale survives the interpretation given to it in Patterson.
One suspects that had Mullaney not been a recent and unanimous
decision, the Patterson Court might have proceeded more forthrightly to
overrule it.
The Patterson analysis finds greater support in the line of cases
affirming the concept of state legislative autonomy. State legislative
power has long been recognized to include the power to allocate the burden
of persuasion. As stated in Speiser v. Randall:
It is of course within the power of the State to regulate procedures
under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing
evidence and the burden of persuasion, "unless in so doing it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental. 83
The concept of state autonomy also finds recognition in Leland v.
Oregon.'4 In Leland, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide
whether an Oregon statute that required the accused, on a plea of insanity,
to establish that defense beyond a reasonable doubt violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In a seven to two decision
78. 432 U.S. at 214.
79. Id. at 215.
80. Id. at 216-25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. 421 U.S. 684, 699 (1975).
82. See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
83. 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958) (quoted in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 201-02), Accord
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
84. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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the Court upheld the statute, saying: "We are . . . reluctant to interfere
with Oregon's determination of its policy since we cannot say that policy
violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice."85
Leland, unlike Winship and Mullaney, specifically recognizes the power
of the state to allocate to the defendant the burden of persuasion on at least
some issues. As the Court realized, 6 Leland provides strong support for
the position taken in Patterson.
B. The Policy Arguments
In addition to its argument from precedent the Court in Patterson
offered three policy justifications for its decision to favor the concept of
state autonomy over the reasonable doubt rule: (1) a "historical" argument
based on the common-law allocation of the burden of persuasion on the
heat of passion defense; (2) a "legislative grace" argument based on the idea
that the power of the state legislatures to refuse to recognize a mitigating
circumstance carries with it the "lesser" power to condition recognition
upon assumption by the defendant of the burden of persuasion on the
issue; and (3) a "social cost" argument based on the assumption that state
legislators would be less willing to recognize mitigating circumstances if
the state were forced to assume the burden of persuasion on those issues.
Consideration of these justifications, however, reveals that they are less
than compelling.
In upholding New York's affirmative defense, the Court found it
relevant that the burden of persuasion on the heat of passion defense was
upon the defendant both at common law and in American law when the
fifth and fourteenth amendments were ratified.87  Such reference to
historical practices in the determination of the constitutional validity of a
current practice is a recognized method of constitutional interpretation,88
but one that should not be conclusive of the scope of constitutional
protections: "Undoubtedly the range of a constitutional provision case in
terms of the common law sometimes may be fixed by recourse to the
applicable rules of that law. But the doctrine whichjustifies such recourse,
like the other canons of construction must yield to more compelling
reasons wherever they exist."8 9
85. Id. at 799. Although Leland predated I1inship and Mullaney the Supreme Court has since
indicated that the decision remains valid. In Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, over the dissents of
Justices Brennan and Marshall, the Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question a
challenge to a Delaware statute that required the defendant to assume the burden of persuasion by a
preponderance of the evidence on the defense of insanity. As noted by the dissent in Rivera,429 U.S.
at 880 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting), summary dismissal of such an appeal is a decision on
the merits and has value as precedent. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975).
86. The Leland opinion is cited extensively in Patterson. 432 U.S. at 202, 205-07.
87. Id. at 202.
88. See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 (1925).
89. 297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936); cf. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry, 294 U.S. 648, 668-69 (1935) (whether a clause in the Constitution is to be restricted by the
rules of English law as they existed when the Constitution was adopted depends on the nature of the
particular clause in question).
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Changes in our understanding of the concepts surrounding the
reasonable doubt rule have limited the usefulness of direct reference to
historical practice in determining the scope of the rule. The common-law
system of allocating the burden of persuasion developed with private
litigation as its model, ignoring an essential difference between civil and
criminal adjudications that contemporary legal scholars have clarified.9"
In civil litigation plaintiffs and defendants stand in exactly the same
relationship to the government; as far as the state is concerned an error
favoring the plaintiff is neither of greater nor of lesser significance than an
error favoring the defendant. The situation is otherwise in a criminal case.
The reasonable doubt rule itself reflects a policy decision that is much
more serious to err in favor of the government than to err in favor of the
criminal defendant.9' A criminal prosecution is not a contest between
competing litigants but rather a selection process whereby particular
individuals are exposed to governmentally imposed punishments. By its
recourse to the allocation of the burden of persuasion at common law, the
Patterson Court allowed current burden of persuasion practices to be
greatly influenced by practices developed before the crucial differences
between civil litigation and criminal prosecution were fully understood.
A second justification offered for the affirmation of state autonomy in
Patterson was the argument that since a state legislature has the power to
refuse to recognize a given mitigating circumstance at all, it has the power
to condition its recognition upon certain procedural qualifications,
including the requirement that the accused assume the burden of
persuading the factfinder of his position. The Court in Patterson said:
"The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York
to the choice of abandoning those defenses [of exculpation and mitigation]
or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to cofivict for a crime
which otherwise is within its power to sanction by substantial punish-
ment. 92
A major problem with the legislative grace argument 93 is that it allows
the state legislatures to enact through procedural finesse a criminal
provision that might not pass muster under normal political processes. It
is a fair assumption, borne out by everyday conversation with nonlawyers,
90. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of burden-of-persuasion practices in criminal
cases, and of the difference between civil and criminal cases that affec':s the proper allocation of the
burden of proof, see Fletcher, TWo Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-
Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968).
91. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
92. 432 U.S. at 207-08.
93. The "legislative grace argument" as denominated herein has been discussed by several
authors using differing terminology. Professor Underwood, in her article The Thumb on the Scales of
Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1312-30 (1977), speaks of"an
exception [to the reasonable doubt rule) for the gratuitous defense." The same argument is referred to
as "the greater includes the lesser" rule in Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due
Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 177-78 (1969).
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that procedural rules are less well understood by most people than
substantive laws.94 While enactment of substantive laws must take place
under relatively exhaustive public scrutiny, lack of understanding and
interest in the procedural law arguably shields the public eye from
observing subtle changes in criminal procedure. For example, a state
legislature that desired to redefine the crime of possessing stolen property
to eliminate the requirement that knowledge of the prior theft be proved
would probably have difficulty gaining public support for such a change.
There would be concern lest people be convicted for good faith or
accidental possession of property that had been stolen. Nevertheless, the
legislature could achieve its desired result in most cases by enacting a law
making lack of knowledge an affirmative defense to the crime of simple
possession.95 The existence of this affirmative defense would create a
substantial risk that some people would be convicted-even though they
lacked knowledge that the property was stolen-because of their inability
to prove lack of knowledge by a preponderance of the evidence. The
burden of persuasion, manipulated in this manner, is a "subtle, low
visibility tool" for adjusting the rights of criminal defendants.96
A second problem with the legislative grace argument is that, once
recognized, its rationale is extremely difficult to contain. Judicial
recognition of the argument has potential spill-over effects of two different
kinds: 97 First, because it applies whenever the state could constitutionally
refuse to recognize the issue in question, it potentially reaches almost every
issue that could arise in a criminal case.98 There are very few criminal
defenses that are not matters of legislative grace. Second, the legislative
grace rationale is not limited in application to the constitutional
protections expressed in the reasonable doubt rule. The same argument
94. The authorities disagree on the validity of this assumption. Cf. Underwoodsupra note93.
at 1323-25; and Ashford & Risinger, supra note 93, at 177-78; with Allen, supra note 56. at 43-45 n. 60
(1977). On this factual premise I will leave the reader to draw his own conclusion in light of his o% n
experience.
95. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973), upholding a presumption of
knowledge that goods were stolen when the prosecution proved possession of recently stolen goods.
96. Fletcher, supra note 92, at 894.
97. For a thorough discussion of the potential spill-over effects of recognition of the legislative
grace argument, see Underwood, supra note 93, at 1325-30.
98. As noted above, there are no clear constitutional doctrines limiting the power of state
legislatures to eliminate particular issues from consideration in determining criminal liability. See text
accompanying note 56 supra.
99. Professor Allen disputes this contention in his article, supra note 56. at 43.45 n.60. In
criticizing Professor Underwood's analysis of the potential spill-over effects of the legislative grace
doctrine, he argues that there is a significant difference between the protections accorded defendants by
the reasonable doubt rule and those accorded by other procedural guarantees. He states that the
former protect only the defendant's liberty interests while the latterserve also to protect the rationality
of the decision making process. In his words, "we insist on rationality in order to preserve the
legitimacy of the criminal process as a means of enhancing social values." His inference that the
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that would allow state legislatures to eliminate the protections of the
reasonable doubt rule on a non-essential or "gratuitous" defense would
also support the elimination of other procedural rights, such as the right to
jury trial or the right to counsel, on that defense. To the extent that the
Court is not willing to recognize the legislative grace argument in contexts
other than the applicability of the reasonable doubt rule to the defense of
extreme emotional disturbance, it has unleashed a powerful device that
might be difficult to control.
The potential for low visibility manipulation of the rights of criminal
defendants and the potential spill-over effects of the legislative grace
doctrine suggest that the Patterson Court should have, been more
circumspect in deciding to use this rationale to justify its decision. In at
least one case involving the constitutionality of presumptions in criminal
cases the Supreme Court previously rejected the application of this
argument. 00
As a third justification for its holding in Patterson the Court offered
an argument based on the "social costs" of recognizing mitigating
circumstances in criminal prosecutions. The argument is that when the
state has assumed the burden of persuasion, there is an increased risk that
guilty persons will escape conviction. This increased risk is a cost that a
state legislature might not be willing to bear. While the legislature might
be willing to recognize a mitigating circumstance if the defendant assumed
the burden of persuasion, it would be more reluctant to recognize the
circumstance if it were forced to pay the cost of assuming the burden.
Legislative reluctance to recognize mitigating circumstances would
have undesirable effects upon the development of the criminal law, as
noted in the Patterson opinion. The legislatures would hesitate to
recognize new defenses that involve facts that the prosecution would have
difficulty proving. °' This attitude would limit the potential for liberal
legislative reforms and would lead the legislatures to define particular
offenses in broad terms, leaving the adjustment between offenses of lesser
and greater degree to the judge's discretion at sentencing.102
The Patterson majority sought to maintain a constitutional
framework in which state legislatures would have the flexibility necessary
reasonable doubt rule does not serve to preserve the legitimacy of the criminal process in unconvincing
in light of the statement in Winship that one purpose of the rule is to preserve community confidence in
the reliability of jury verdicts. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
100. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 144 (1965). See also Ashford & Risingcr,supra
note 93, at 178-80.
101. 432 U.S. at 209 n.ll.
102. Id. at211n.13. It was noted in a concurring opinion to the state court decision in Patterson
that the gradation of offenses in the statute itself is preferable to gradation in the sentencing process
because it offers the defendant the opportunity to introduce his mitig.ting circumstances earlier in the
proceedings. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 305, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 584 (1976) (Breitel, C.J.,
concurring). The defendant is given the opportunity to present his evidence of mitigating
circumstances to the jury as well as the judge. Gradation of offenses ?rior to the sentencing stage also
promotes uniform treatment of defendants.
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to the continued development of the criminal law. The Court decided not
to require the state to assume the burden of persuasion on a given issue if
"in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, or too
inaccurate."
103
The social cost argument in Patterson is to a large extent valid.
Legislatures will probably be reluctant to recognize mitigating circum-
stances if the risk of acquitting guilty defendants must thereby be
increased. On the other hand, manipulation of the burden of persuasion is
an undesirable means of reducing this risk, since, by reducing the total
number of acquittals, it adversely affects innocent defendants who have
poor access to evidence.
Shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant is not the only
method by which the legislatures can limit the social costs of recognizing
new defenses. An alternative is to shift the burden of production.0
4
Placing only the latter burden on the accused would allow him to avail
himself of a defense if he could present enough evidence to raise a
reasonable doubt on the issue. Once the issue had been raised, the burden
of persuasion would be on the state. The state, however, would be spared
the cost of proving the issue beyond a reasonable doubt in those cases in
which the defendant could produce no evidence reasonably tending to
establish the defense. Use of this alternative would reduce the risk that an
innocent defendant would be denied the benefit of a recognized defense.
The availability of this alternative means of cutting social costs should
decrease legislative reluctance to recognize mitigating circumstances as
defenses to crimes. Given the alternative, legislators might be willing to
assume the cost of retaining the ultimate burden of persuasion.
The three policy arguments offered by the Patterson Court are
insufficient to justify its decision. This circumstance, coupled with the
Court's somewhat disingenuous distinction of an unfavorable line of case
authority, suggests that Patterson will not prove to be an enduring
decision. The Court will probably be asked in a future case to redraw the
boundaries of the reasonable doubt rule in a manner more protective of the
important interests of criminal defendants and of society as recognized in
Winship.
103. 432 U.S. at 209.
104. The burden of production, also known as the burden of going forward with the evidence, is
the second component of what is commonly referred to as the burden of proof. See note 5stpra. The
burden of production comes into play in determining which of the issues of the case are to besubmitted
to the factfinder for decision. Failure by the party burdened to meet the burden of production uill
result in a directed verdict against that party. The burden of production is critical in a jury trial
because failure to meet the burden will allow the judge to decide the issue without the jury's
consideration. See McCoRMicK's, supra note 5, § 336.
Both the Mullaney majority, 241 U.S. at 701 n.28 and the Patterson dissent, 432 U.S. at 230-31
(Powell, J., dissenting) indicated that it is constitutionally permissible to require a criminal defendant
to assume the burden of production on certain issues.
1978]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE Patterson ANALYSIS
The Patterson opinion has been criticized as too formalistic,
inconsistent with several prior cases, and insufficiently supported by policy
considerations. The question now presented is whether there is a better
way to define the limits of the reasonable doubt rule.
The Court, in a future decision on the question. might well begin by
following a principle of constitutional construction set forth in earlier
Supreme Court cases: "If we remember that it is a Constitution that we are
expounding we cannot rightly prefer, of the possible meanings of its words,
that which will defeat rather than effectuate the constitutional purpose."
10 5
The purpose of the reasonable doubt rule, as identified in Winship,'"6 is to
provide "concrete substance for the presumption of innocence" by
"reducing the risk of convictions based upon factual error,' 10 7
The fundamental defect of the Patterson decision is that it gives no
concrete substance to the presumption of innocence. The applicability of
the reasonable doubt rule and thus the substance of the presumption of
innocence, after Patterson, rests upon the shifting sands of legislative word
choice.' 8 In developing a more acceptable alternative to the Patterson
decision the principal question facing a future court will be the
determination of what substance the presumption of innocence was meant
to have.
To say that a person is innocent is to say that imposition of a criminal
sanction upon that person would be unjust. Put another way, the concept
of innocence is tied to the justification for the criminal sanction. By the
same token, the scope of the reasonable doubt rule-a rule designed to
protect the presumption of innocence-should be determined with
reference to such theories of justification.10 9 The state should be required
to assume the burden of persuasion on issues that relate to thejustifiability
of imposing the criminal sanction.
This approach would allow the state to allocate to the defendant the
burden of persuasion on issues such as the admissibility of evidence ob-
tained in a search or the defense of the statute of limitations. Such issues
relate not to the justifiability of imposing criminal sanctions, but rather to
institutional values in the administration of the criminal justice system. A
defendant who successfully asserts the defense of the statute of limitations,
for example, is spared conviction not because punishment would be
105. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,316(1941); accord, Lichterv. United States, 334 U.S.
742 (1948); Kendall v. United States ex reL Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
106. 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
107. See text accompanying notes 1-4 and 65-67 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
109. A number of authors have advocated approaches to the reasonable doubt rule based upon
the underlying justifications for criminal sanctions. See H. PACKER, TinE LiMhis or TIll CRIMINAL
SANCTION, 62-70, 136-39 (1968); Fletcher, supra note 91, at 880; Underwood, supra note 95, at 1338-47.
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unjust, but because the legislature has made a policy decision to disallow
convictions on stale charges. Since innocence is not implicated in these
defenses, it would not violate the presumption of innocence to allocate to
the defendant the burden of persuasion on these issues.
The proposed test presents two problems that touch the conceptual
bases of the criminal law. The first is that a state might adopt a particular
defense for any of several reasons, some related to the justifiability of
criminalization and some not. For example, the defense of entrapment
may relate to the defendant's willingness to engage in crime, and thus to his
culpability,1 or it may be merely a device for enforcing a legislative policy
to discourage government officials from inducing crimes."' A court
reviewing the applicability of the reasonable doubt rule under the
proposed test would have to decide whether to accept a state's legislative or
judicial statement of the purpose of the defense or to engage in an
independent appraisal.
A second potential problem arises from the fact that there is no single,
universally accepted theory of justification for criminalization. The
theories of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation, in various permuta-
tions, have all been urged as bases for the imposition of criminal
liability." 2 These theories are divergent and frequently contradictory in
their implications."13 Nevertheless, there are certain basic premises upon
which Anglo-American criminal law is founded 14 and from which at least
some basic requirements of justification may be derived!" 5
It far exceeds the scope of this Case Comment to attempt to articulate
the essential elements that the state should be required to prove in order to
justify the imposition of criminal sanctions. The present objective is
merely to point out that an approach to the reasonable doubt rule based
upon the concept of justifiability would contribute much to individual
freedom by providing concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence.
A reconsideration of the scope of the reasonable doubt rule should
also address the second part of the rule's function, to reduce the risk that an
innocent defendant will be erroneously convicted. The analysis designed
to achieve this purpose should focus upon how the placement of the
burden of persuasion on a particular issue affects the probability of error.
Issues vary in their difficulty of proof. For example, even if the burden of
persuasion were on the defendant to prove the existence of a valid license
as a defense to the charge of unlicensed operation of a tavern, it is unlikely
110. See, e.g., United States v. Russe, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
111. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
112. See generally H. PACKER, supra note 109, at 35-61.
113. Id. at 9-16.
114. See generally J. HALL: GE ERL PmNCIPL.s OF CIUMINAL LAW (3d ed. 1960).
115. See H. PAcKER supra note 109, at 62-135.
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that he would be unable to prove his innocence if indeed he had a valid
license. On the other hand, self-defense can be very difficult for an
innocent defendant to prove. Placing the burden of persuasion on the
tavern keeper on the license defense would be unlikely to lead to injustice,
but placing the burden on the defendant on the issue of self-defense would
be very likely to lead to injustice. Consideration of defendant's ease of
proof would support an exception to the reasonable doubt rule for the
license defense but not for the issue of self-defense.
An alternative approach to the reasonable doubt rule not based upon
justifiability, was proposed by Justice Powell in his dissent in Patterson.,16
Powell's approach employs a two-pronged' 17 test derived from Mullaney,
but with significant differences. The first prong of the test incorporates the
operative effects test of Mullaney;' 8 the Court is directed to consider
whether the fact at issue significantly affects the punishment or
stigmatization of the defendant. The second prong is historical inquiry to
determine whether the fact in question has historically made a substintial
difference in punishment and stigma.
The effect of Justice Powell's approach is to increase the importance
of historical analysis in the Mullaney approach. Mullaney used history to
indicate whether an issue substantially affected the consequences to the
defendant. The Patterson dissent makes historical significance a
necessary precondition to application of the reasonable doubt rule. A
given factual issue must at the time of challenge make a substantial
difference in punishment and stigma and must have done so in the past in
order to fall within the rule's scope.
The addition of the second prong to the "operative effect9" test is an
attempt to limit the overly broad implications of the Mullaney analysis.
Mullaney sought to protect the innocent defendant from the risk of an
erroneous conviction by protecting all defendants against the risk of
serious consequences of conviction. Unlike the 'test proposed in this
Comment, it focused neither upon innocence nor upon probability of
error. As a result, the Mullaney test gave to the reasonable doubt rule a
broader scope than was necessary to serve the rule's purpose. For
example, the defendant who successfully asserts the statute of limitations is
acquitted and consequently suffers substantially less punishment and
stigma than he would if he had been convicted. Under the Mullaney text
the reasonable doubt rule would apply to the statute of limitations defense,
but under a test tailored to the concept of innocence the rule would not
apply.
The Patterson dissent's approach limits the reach of the Mullaney
116. 432 U.S. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
117. Id. at 226-27.
118. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
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analysis, but in a way that freezes the scope of the reasonable doubt rule.
Conceptions of the proper justification for criminal sanction change; in
the past half-century the predominant theoretical justification for criminal
sanctions has shifted from retribution to rehabilitation. With changes in
the theory of criminality, the content of the concept of innocence changes.
As our knowledge of human behavior grows, factors that might have
been irrelevant to the disposition of criminal cases at common law have
become important. To limit the scope of the reasonable doubt rule to
those factors that have been significant in the Anglo-American legal
tradition would prevent the growth and adaptation of the rule to accord
with modem conceptions of the functions of the criminal law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reasonable doubt rule, after Patterson v. New York, applies only
to those issues that the state legislatures have chosen to include in the
portion of the statutory text defining the offense charged. State autonomy
in this area of criminal law has been vindicated. The delicate balancing of
the interests of the accused and those of the state with respect to the burden
of persuasion will take place in the legislative chambers rather than in the
courts.
The approach taken by the Court in Patterson is not responsive to the
purposes of the reasonable doubt rule. The Court failed to give concrete
substance to the presumption of innocence. The Patterson approach does
little to protect those accused of crimes against the risk of erroneous
conviction. Given these shortcomings, it is likely that the Court will have
the opportunity to reconsider its position.
Alternative approaches have been suggested that would better serve
the rule's purposes. Mullaney's "operative effects" standard would have
provided a measure of judicial control over burden of persuasion practices
but would have increased the burden on the states beyond the extent
necessary to protect innocent defendants. Justice Powell, in his dissent to
Patterson, proposed to modify Mullaney, but in a way that would have
destroyed the adaptability of the rule to changing ideas about crime and
criminals.
A workable alternative would be to determine the scope of the
reasonable doubt rule with reference to the underlying justifications for the
use of the criminal sanction. Of the facts in issue in a given criminal case,
the state would be required to prove those that justify the imposition of
sanctions. Such an approach would provide concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence but would not unduly burden the states.
Mark R. Adams
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